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Abstract
Recent efforts to forge a consensus on the role developing countries should play in
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions have focused attention on climate friendly
technologies (CFTs), most notably those that enhance energy efficiency.  In the medium term,
the effectiveness of technology-based climate strategies will depend critically on the rates at
which CFTs diffuse in developing countries.  This paper reviews some of the key findings of
the economics research on technology diffusion and assesses the implications for climate
policy.  The most obvious lessons from this research are that widespread diffusion of CFTs
may take decades, and that diffusion rates in developing and industrialized countries are likely
to be quite different.  In addition, the literature has implications for a number of strategies for
promoting technology diffusion including information dissemination, factor price
rationalization, and investment in human capital.
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THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Allen Blackman*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Recent efforts to forge a consensus on the role developing countries should play in
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions have focused attention on climate friendly
technologies (CFTs).  Developing countries are expected to supersede industrialized countries
as the leading source of greenhouse gas emissions in the next thirty years.  Yet their ability
and willingness to contribute to abatement efforts is constrained by limited financial
resources, weak regulatory institutions, and the perception that they should not have to bear
the costs of mitigating a problem primarily created by industrialized countries.  CFTs are seen
by many as a means of surmounting these obstacles.
Many types of CFTs -- notably, energy efficiency innovations -- not only reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases but also cut production costs.  As a result, such technologies
could conceivably diffuse spontaneously in developing countries, obviating the need for
government financing and regulation.  Efforts to promote the diffusion of CFTs are likely to
garner widespread support since they represent opportunities to enhance productivity and abate
local pollution in the eyes of developing countries, and opportunities to boost exports of
equipment and expertise in the eyes of industrialized countries.
But how likely is it that technology-based strategies will have a significant impact on
greenhouse gas emissions in the near to medium term?  In part, the answer depends on
whether, once introduced, CFTs would diffuse at a reasonably rapid pace, and whether policy
makers will be able to speed the rate of diffusion.
For at least the last thirty years researchers have tried to better understand the
economics of the diffusion of new technologies.  This paper reviews some of the key findings
of this research and assesses the implications of these findings for the ongoing debate about
the technology-based climate change strategies.  The paper is organized as follows.  The next
section identifies the key issues addressed by the literature.  The third section reviews theories
of technology diffusion.  The fourth section summarizes the empirical evidence.  And the last
section develops policy prescriptions.
2. QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ON
TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
Though, as discussed in detail below, the evidence on some questions concerning
technology diffusion is inconclusive, there is a broad consensus on two points.  First, new
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technologies are never adopted by all potential users at the same time.  The widespread
diffusion of new technologies can take anywhere from between five to fifty years, depending
on the innovation (Mansfield, 1968).  Second, countless studies have confirmed that the
diffusion of new technologies follows a predictable temporal pattern -- technologies are
adopted rather slowly at first, then more rapidly, and then slowly again as a technology
specific "adoption ceiling" is reached.  Thus, a plot of the number or the proportion of
adopters over time assumes a sigmoid shape.  These stylized facts have prompted researchers
to focus on two related questions:
• Why do some innovations diffuse more quickly that other innovations?
• Why do some firms adopt a given innovation faster than others?
The next section reviews theoretical answers to these questions.
3.   ECONOMIC THEORIES OF TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
As discussed in Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), theories of technology diffusion fall
into four categories: epidemic models, rank models, order models, and stock models.
3.1   Epidemic Models
The oldest and perhaps most influential of the four models discussed here, the
epidemic model (Mansfield, 1961) is premised on the idea that the spread of information
about a new technology is the key to explaining diffusion.  According to this theory, initially,
potential adopters have little or no information about the new technology and are therefore
unable or disinclined to adopt it.  However, as diffusion proceeds, non-adopters glean
technical information from adopters via their day to day interactions with them, just as one
may contract a disease by casual contact with an infected person.  As a result, as the number
of adopters grows, the dissemination of information accelerates, and the speed of diffusion
increases.  Eventually however, as the number adopters exceeds the number of non-adopters,
the speed of diffusion falls off.  Importantly, the probability of a non-adopter becoming
"infected" by contact with an adopter is not the same for every technology; it depends on
characteristics of the technology such as profitability, risk, and the size of the investment
required to adopt.
Thus, epidemic models hypothesize that some firms adopt later than others because
they do not have sufficient information about the new technology; this information must be
gleaned from adopters.  Furthermore, epidemic models hypothesize that some innovations
diffuse faster than others because for some technologies the chance of 'infection' is higher
than for others owing to characteristics of the technology.
Epidemic models have been criticized for a number of reasons (see e.g., Davies, 1979;
Stoneman, 1983).  First, all firms are assumed to have an equal chance of becoming infected,
an assumption that violates common sense since some firms -- for example, those with largeAllen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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cash reserves, higher rates of capital replacement, better managers, etc. -- would naturally
seem more prone to adopt than others.  Second, there is no explicit explanation for how firms'
profit maximizing goals could generate the hypothesized aggregate behavior.  So called "rank
models" remedy both shortcomings.
3.2   Rank Models
Rank models are premised on the idea that heterogeneity among firms explains
observed diffusion patterns.  Firms are hypothesized to differ with regard to some critical
variable that affects the expected present discounted profitability of the new technology
relative to the old one -- the "net return on adoption" for short.  Seven different critical
variables have been identified.
(i) Capital vintage.  Firms with older less productive vintages of capital find it
more profitable to adopt than firms with newer capital (Salter, 1960).
(ii) Firm size.  Large firms able to spread risks, access credit, and to take
advantage of economies of scale associated with new technologies find it more
profitable to adopt than smaller firms (Davies, 1979; David, 1975; Feder and
O'Mara, 1981).
(iii) Beliefs about the return on the new technology.  Firms whose guesses about the
profitability of the new technology are overly pessimistic find it less profitable
to adopt than firms with more optimistic expectations (Stoneman, 1980;
Jensen, 1983).
(iv) Search costs.  Firms that incur higher transactions costs in learning about the
new technology because of their location or stock of physical and human
capital, finds it less profitable to adopt than firms with lower search costs.
(v) Input prices.  Variations in input prices across firms and input requirements
across technologies imply that some firms obtain a higher return the new
technology than others.
(vi) Factor productivity.  Variations in factor productivity across firms, including
variations in labor productivity due to human capital, imply that some firms
obtain a higher net return on adoption than others (Kislev and Shchori-
Bachrach, 1973).
(vii) Regulatory costs.  Variations in firms' exposure or susceptibility to regulatory
costs can affect the net return on adoption when the new technology has
different regulatory implications than the old (Ecchia and Mariotti, 1994;
Millman and Prince, 1989).Allen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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Given that firms are heterogeneous across these variables, they may be 'ranked'
according to their net return on adoption.  For some firms the net return on adoption will be
negative.  Over time, however, the net return on adoption rises for all or some firms, so that
more and more firms chose to adopt.  The net return on adoption is hypothesized to increase
over time for any number of reasons including:
(i) External economies of scale.  Production costs may fall as a result of, among
other things, the growth of pools of trained labor and upstream suppliers that
complement the new technology;
(ii) Learning by doing.  Adopters refine and perfect the new technology;
(iii) Falling search costs.  The costs of acquiring information about the new
technology and uncertainty about it fall over time;
(iv) Depreciation of existing capital.
Thus, rank models hypothesize that firms adopt at different times because they
because they differ with respect to some critical variable that affects their net return on
adoption.  For some firms this net return may be negative.  Over time, however, the net return
on adoption rises for all or some firms so that more and more firms adopt.  Furthermore, rank
models imply that innovations diffuse at different speeds either because for some technologies
the distribution of net returns on adoption over the population of potential users is different
than for other innovations, or because for some technologies the net return on adoption
increases faster over time than for other innovations.
3.3   Order Models
Order models are premised on the idea that the order in which firms adopt the new
technology determines the net return that they obtain from it, with earlier adopters obtaining
higher net returns (e.g., Ireland and Stoneman, 1985; and Fundenberg and Tirole, 1985).  The
order effect arises from the existence of a fixed critical input into production such skilled
labor for software developers or access to prime drilling sites for petroleum explorers.
Because of this order effect, initially it will only be profitable for a limited number of firms to
adopt.  Note that this result holds even if firms are assumed to be identical.  However, over
time, the net return on adoption increases (for the same reasons as in rank models) so that
eventually more and more firms adopt.
Thus, order models hypothesize that firms adopt at different times because the net
return on adoption is negative for firms that are slow to adopt relative to their rivals.  Over
time, however, the net return on adoption rises so that more and more firms adopt.
Furthermore, order models imply that innovations diffuse at different speeds because for some
technologies, the order effect is stronger than for others (because, for example the pool orAllen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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trained labor is smaller for some technologies than for others) and/or because for some
technologies, the net return on adoption increases faster over time than for other technologies.
3.4   Stock Models
Stock models are premised on the idea that the net return on adoption for any firm
depends on the total stock of firms that have adopted, with the net return on adoption declining as
the stock increases (e.g., Reinganum, 1981; Quirmbach, 1986).  Stock effects are hypothesized to
arise when the adoption of a new technology by a subset of firms in the industry lowers their
average production costs to such an extent that output prices fall.  Lower output prices in turn,
reduce the net return on adoption.  Given this stock effect, initially it will only be profitable for a
certain number of firms to adopt.  Note that this effect does not depend on heterogeneity among
firms or on the order in which firms adopt.  However, as in both rank and order models, the net
return on adoption increases over time so that more and more firms adopt.
Thus, stock models hypothesize that firms adopt at different times because the net
return on adoption falls as the stock of adopters grows.  Over time, however, the net return on
adoption rises so that more and more firms adopt.  Furthermore, stock models imply that
innovations diffuse at different speeds because for some technologies, the stock effect is
stronger than for others (because, for example, the new technology has a larger impact on firm
costs and therefore on output prices) and/or because for  some technologies, the net return on
adoption increases faster than for other innovations.
3.5   Other Considerations: Technology Suppliers and Research and Development
In addition to the factors that play a role in models described above, two others have
received some attention in the theoretical literature: the role of technology suppliers and the
role of research and development (R&D).  All of the models described above focus on the
demand for new technologies by end-users and simply assume a perfectly elastic supply of the
new technology.  But, obviously this is an oversimplification -- supply-side considerations
like the competitiveness of markets for the new technology could clearly affect the diffusion
process.  Several researchers have incorporated supply-side considerations into diffusion
models (for a review see Stoneman, 1991).
In addition, a number of researchers have argued that firms' expenditures on adapting
new technologies to their particular circumstances and on searching for new technologies --
i.e., R&D expenditures -- are closely linked to diffusion.  Diffusion of new technologies
stimulates R&D, and R&D undoubtedly stimulates diffusion (Stoneman, 1991; Cohen and
Leventhal, 1989).  There is a considerable economics literature on R&D that is relevant.
However, for the most part it has not been integrated into the diffusion literature.
3.6   Conclusion
What then does the economic theory of technology diffusion tell us about why some
firms adopt earlier than another and why some innovations diffuse faster than others?  First itAllen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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is important to note that the models described here do not necessarily offer competing
explanations of diffusion.  They generally incorporate only one explanation at a time for the
sake of tractability.  Nevertheless, in many, if not most, respects, these models are not
inconsistent with each other.  There is no reason why diffusion of a given technology could
not be influenced by some combination of epidemic, rank, order, stock and supply-side
effects.  In fact, this is likely to be the case in the real world (though, in certain circumstances,
one type of effect may dominate).  Thus, the most accurate -- though perhaps unsatisfying --
conclusion to this section on theory is that a broad range of factors are likely to affect
technology diffusion.  The factors emphasized in the theoretical models include:
Information and learning.  A critical factor in each of the models described above.
The dissemination of information about the new technology drives diffusion in the
epidemic model.  In the rank, order, and stock models, learning by doing and the
spread of technical information cause the net return on adoption, and therefore the
proportion of adopters, to increase over time.  Finally, in some versions of the rank
model, differential access to information about the new technology determines
which firms adopt and which do not in the initial period.
Characteristics of potential adopters.  Differences in firm-specific characteristics
that affect the return on the new or old technology drive diffusion in the rank
model.  These characteristics include: capital vintage, firm size, beliefs about the
return on the new technology, search costs, input prices, factor productivity, and
regulatory costs.
Characteristics of technology.  In every model discussed above, characteristics of
the new technology such as risk, average return, and intellectual property
restrictions affect the net return on adoption,.
Fixed resources.  Limitations on the supply of a critical input into the new
technology drive diffusion in order models.
Effect of adoption on output prices ("general equilibrium" effects).  The effect of
adoption on reductions in average production costs and on the price of output drives
diffusion in stock models.
4.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
Empirical tests of technology diffusion have used data at the level of the firm, sector,
and country.  Firm-level data has been used to test for the impact of firm characteristics on
either adoption or time to adoption.  Sector-level data has been used to test for the impact of
sector characteristics (usually average characteristics of firms in the sector) on the speed ofAllen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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diffusion (usually the slope parameter of an estimated diffusion curve for a given sector).
Sector-level data has also been used to test for the impact of the characteristics of the new
technology on the speed of diffusion.  Finally, country-level data has been used to test for the
impact of sector and macroeconomic characteristics on the speed of diffusion.
Since most of the sector-level research uses average firm characteristics to explain
diffusion, the majority of the empirical research on technology diffusion boils down to an
examination of how firm characteristics affect diffusion.  This research can be thought of as a
test of the rank model described above.1  This section is mainly devoted to describing the
findings of this research.  In addition, I provide a brief description of the findings of the two
other types of studies: those of the impact of the characteristics of a technology on diffusion
and the impact of macroeconomic characteristics on diffusion.
4.1   The Impact of Technological Characteristics
Perhaps because the data requirements are daunting, there are a relatively small number
of studies on how the characteristics of technologies affect diffusion.  Mansfield (1961) is the
most widely cited.  Using data on nine different innovations in four industries, Mansfield tests
for correlation between the speed of diffusion on one hand and the average profitability of the
innovation (measured as the average ex post payback period) and the average initial investment
required for adoption, on the other hand.  Not surprisingly, he finds both of these variables to
be significant.  Using data on the diffusion of twenty two process innovations in the UK,
Davies (1979) finds significant differences between the diffusion patterns of relatively cheap
and simple innovations and more expensive and complex ones.  He finds that the simple
innovations a diffused relatively quickly during the beginning of the observation period, and
more slowly at the end.
4.2   The Impact of Firm and Sector Characteristics
Among firm and sector characteristics that impact on diffusion, researchers have
devoted the most attention to firm size and market structure.  In addition, they have examined
the impact of factor prices, factor productivity, infrastructure, vintage of capital stock,
macroeconomic variables, R&D expenditures, and institutional differences.
Firm size.  Almost all empirical studies of diffusion test the Schumpeterian hypothesis
that large firms in concentrated industries are both more innovative and faster to adopt new
technologies than small firms.  Considerable evidence supports the second part of the
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hypothesis -- that large firms adopt earlier, e.g., Antonelli and Tahar (1990a), Globerman
(1975), Romeo (1975), Davies (1979), Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985), and Karshenas and
Stoneman (1993).  However, these findings beg the question of why large firms adopt faster.
A number of hypothesis were offered in Section 3.2.  Some research has attempted to test
these underlying hypotheses.  For example, Rose and Joskow (1990) control for the fact that
large firms turn over capital faster than small firms, and still find a significant correlation
between firm size and adoption.  This suggest that large firms adopt earlier because of
economies of scale, superior human capital, or easy access to credit.
Market structure.  The evidence on the impact of market structure on diffusion is
inconclusive.  For example, Hannan and McDowell (1984) and Sommers (1980) find that
concentration is positively correlated with the adoption of new technologies, while Romeo
(1975) finds the opposite.  Other studies find market structure has no observable impact on
the speed of diffusion.  According to Davies (1979) the reason that the evidence is
inconclusive is that market concentration proxies for two countervailing effects.  On one
hand, the number of firms in concentrated industries tends to relatively low, which facilitates
information flows and speeds diffusion.  On the other hand, firm size in concentrated
industries tends to be quite variable which slows diffusion.
Factor Prices.  There is considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that faster
diffusion is correlated with relatively low prices of inputs used intensively by adopters (e.g.,
Jarvis, 1981).  Some studies have found a direct relationship between wage rates and the
speed of diffusion of labor saving technologies ( e.g., Antonelli and Tahar, 1990b).
Human Capital.  There is also considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that
firms with higher levels of human capital have been early adopters.  Much of this evidence
concerns that adoption of agricultural innovations (e.g., Lin, 1991, Pitt and Sumodiningrat,
1991).
Regulation.  Recently, a number of researchers have found some empirical evidence of
a link between formal regulatory pressure and clean technological change (e.g., Lanjouw and
Mody, 1993; Jaffe and Stavins, 1995).  Notwithstanding this theory and evidence, the link
between regulation and technological change will obviously dissolve if enforcement is lax.
This is often the case in developing countries.  However, a growing body of recent research
shows that community pressure -- also known as "informal regulation" -- applied by private-
sector groups such as neighborhood organizations, non-governmental organizations, and trade
unions can substitute for formal regulatory pressure (e.g. Pargal and Wheeler, 1996).
Blackman and Bannister (1998) find that informal regulation is correlated with the adoption
of a clean technology.Allen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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Infrastructure, Capital Vintage, and Research and Development.  Research has
verified that early adoption of new technologies is directly related to R&D expenditures
(Romeo, 1975) and the existence of complimentary infrastructure (Hastings, 1976; Minami
and Makino, 1983) and is inversely related to capital vintage (Oster, 1982).
4.3   International Differences in Diffusion
Though studies of international differences in diffusion are relatively rare, their
findings echo those of single country, sector-level studies.  Using data on the diffusion of
synthetic rubber in twelve countries, Swan (1973) finds that faster diffusion was correlated
with industry growth, exports, and date of adoption.2  A number of studies have sought to
explain the relatively slow diffusion of the basic oxygen furnaces (used in steelmaking) in the
United States vis a vis other countries, namely Japan.  While some have argued that
inefficiency caused by trade barriers slowed diffusion (e.g., Adams and Dirlam, 1966), others
have argued that differences in factor prices and industry growth rates in the two countries
have been determinative (e.g., Maddalla and Knight, 1967; Lynn 1980).  Otsuka et al. (1988)
argues that differences in human capital explained the fact that ring spinning diffused faster in
Japan than in India.  Antonelli et al. (1990b) argues that international differences in the
diffusion of shuttleless looms in fifteen countries was explained by, inter alia, differences in
sectoral rates of growth.  Nabseth and Ray (1974) bring together a collection of studies of the
diffusion of ten process technologies in six countries.  Though for at least one technology
(numerically controlled machine tools) wage rates seem to have had the greatest impact on
diffusion, according to Stoneman (1983), "If anything is to come from these studies it is that
the different production programs, product mixes, and institutional characteristics of firms are
key factors in the diffusion process."  Finally, some studies have sought to explain
international differences in diffusion rates with macroeconomic statistics such as GDP and
money supply (e.g., Lucke, 1993; Blackman and Boyd, 1995).  While these studies have
found that macroeconomic characteristics are indeed correlated with speed of diffusion,
explanations for these correlations are necessarily ad hoc.
4.4   Conclusion
To sum up this section, empirical investigations have, by in large, used firm-level and
sector-level data on the diffusion of a single technology in a single country.  These
investigations may be considered test of the rank model discussed above.  There is good
evidence that adoption and/or the speed of diffusion is directly related to: firm size, human
capital, regulatory costs of the old technology, complimentary infrastructure, industry growth,
and R&D expenditures, and is inversely related to the prices of factors used intensively by the
new technology, and capital vintage.  Despite considerable research, the evidence on the
impact of market structure on adoption and diffusion is inconclusive.
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In addition to the above research, the literature includes investigations of international
differences in diffusion and of the impact of the characteristics of the new technology on
diffusion.  The latter finds that the speed of diffusion is directly related to its profitability and
is inversely related to the size of the investment required and the complexity of the technology
(in the early stages of the diffusion cycle).  The findings of literature on international
differences in diffusion echo those of the single country studies.
5.   POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
What does the theoretical and empirical research suggest for technology-based climate
change policy?  Two implications are immediately obvious, if facile.  First, even if CFTs that
significantly lower production costs can be transferred to developing countries, diffusion will
not be immediate.  If past evidence is an accurate guide, near complete penetration will take
from five to fifty years.  The theoretical models reviewed above offer a wide range of
explanations for lagged adoption.  Second, and relatedly, CFTs will not necessarily be rapidly
adopted in developing countries simply because they reduce production costs in industrialized
countries.  We have seen that a broad range of firm-, sector-, and country-level characteristics
can determine whether or not and how quickly new technologies are adopted.  These include:
firms size, factor prices, human capital, infrastructure, the profitability of old capital, the turn
over of old capital, learning by doing, the scarcity of inputs vital to the new technology,
search and transactions costs associated with adoption, miscellaneous institutional factors, and
path dependency.  There are likely to be systematic differences between developing countries
and industrialized countries in nearly all of these characteristics.  To give one example, labor
is generally much more costly relative to capital in developing countries.  Therefore, labor
saving technology that is profitable in industrialized countries will not necessarily be
profitable in developing countries.
In addition to these two rather obvious points, it is important to note that, as Stoneman
and Diederen (1994) make clear, faster diffusion of a technology is not necessarily welfare
enhancing.  Diffusion may be "too fast" if firms adopt a technology before it is profitable to
do so, or if firms adopt a new technology today that effectively preempts the adoption of a
superior technology in the future.
Having made these three points we may now proceed to a discussion of the policy
levers that are available to influence the speed of diffusion of CFTs in developing countries.
Given the theory and evidence presented above, there would seem to be seven types of policy
levers available -- those concerning:  information, factor prices, regulation, credit, human
capital, infrastructure, research and development and intellectual property rights.
5.1   Information
As discussed in Section 3, the dissemination of information about the new technology
is a critical determinant of diffusion in each of the theoretical models; it drives diffusion in the
epidemic model and raises the return of adoption over time in the rank, order, and stockAllen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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models.  That paucity of empirical support for the importance of information probably stems
from the difficulty of measuring information flows.3  As Stoneman and Diederen (1994) point
out, government intervention to enhance the dissemination of technical information is likely
to justified since information is bound to be imperfect.  Firms may acquire information about
new technologies in three ways: through the costless day to day contact with other firms
emphasized in the epidemic model, through active search as described in some rank models,
and through the advertising of technology suppliers.  Each of these mechanisms is subject to
imperfections.  In the first mechanism -- casual contact -- early adopters supply information
about the new technology to later adopters, but do not capture any of the benefits from this
information transfer themselves.  As a result, they do not have proper incentives to make this
information available to their rivals.  In the second mechanism -- active search -- firms
operating independently, will engage in inefficient duplication of search efforts.  And in the
third mechanism -- advertising -- technology suppliers who are concerned about market share,
not the diffusion of the technology, have incentives to oversupply technical information,
which may lead to too rapid diffusion of intermediate technology.4
Policy options for enhancing the flow of information about new technologies include:
demonstration projects, advertising campaigns, the testing and certification of new
technologies, and subsidies to technological consulting services.  Have such mechanisms had a
verifiable impact on diffusion?  Demonstration projects have received wide application in the
context of developing country agriculture.  There is some evidence that they have been quite
effective.  Many industrialized countries have set up regional information clearinghouses to
provide consulting services to small and medium sized businesses that presumably can least
afford search costs associated with adoption.  For example, the US Department of commerce
sponsors a network of "Manufacturing Technology Centers."  Similar networks have been
established in the United Kingdom (the Advanced Information Technology Programme, and
the Regional Office Technology Transfer Programme) and in Europe (Centres Regionaux
d'Innovation et de Transfer de Technolgie in France, and the SPRINT programme in the
European Union).  As yet evaluations of these programs have been limited.
5.2   Factor Prices
Both theory and evidence attest to the important role that factor prices play in the
diffusion of new technologies.  In particular, energy prices clearly have a critical impact on the
adoption of energy saving technologies.  In many developing and reforming economies, energy
is highly subsidized (World Bank, 1992, 69).  Removing or significantly scaling back energy
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4 Despite these market imperfections, Stoneman and Diederen (1994) sound a cautionary note about attempts to
mitigate them.  They point out that information-based polices may actually retard diffusion by fostering the
expectation that improved technologies are forthcoming, and therefore creating incentives to defer adoption.
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subsidies in these countries would create incentives to adopt energy saving technologies.5  In
countries where energy prices are not subsidized, taxing energy to raise its effective price
above the market price would clearly have the same effect as removing subsidies.
5.3   Regulation
As discussed in Section 4, empirical research supports the hypothesis that firms that
pay higher environmental regulatory costs are more likely to adopt clean technologies,
including CFTs.  The opportunities for and barriers to effective regulation in developing
countries have received considerable attention, especially in the last ten years.  Even a brief
synopsis of this literature is outside the scope of this paper (for reviews see World Bank,
1992; Blackman and Harrington, 1999).  Two points may be worth emphasizing, however.
First, the use of market-based incentives such as pollution taxes and marketable permit
systems is analogous to raising the price of a critical factor of production -- environmental
services, and therefore, the same arguments about the link between factor prices and
technology adoption are applicable.  Second, as mentioned in Section 4, even when
institutional and financial constraints make formal public-sector-led regulation problematic,
private-sector-led "informal" initiatives can be an effective substitute.
5.4   Credit
As discussed in Section 4, empirical studies of the adoption of new technologies in
developing countries have often identified lack of access to credit as a critical barrier to
adoption.  Subsidizing credit for specific types of investments has been has been a common
policy response.  Thus far these programs -- both public and private -- have had very mixed
results.  Chronic problems include the diversion of loans by borrowers to non-targeted
activities, low repayment rates, the creation of financially unsustainable lending institutions,
and the undermining of existing credit markets (Adams and von Pische, 1992).  Given the
growing consensus that the costs of 'targeted' credit outweigh the benefits, a wiser approach to
overcoming financial barriers to technological innovation is to focus on improving financial
intermediation which, in developing countries, is often hamstrung by unstable monetary
policy, interest rate restrictions, and weak property rights (Fry, 1988).
5.5   Human Capital, Infrastructure, and Research and Development
The policy implications of the literature that identifies human capital and infra-
structure as key predictors of early adoption is obviously to promote education and technical
training and to build and maintain infrastructure.  This needn't be a broad-brush and long-term
strategy if investments are focused on greenhouse gas intensive sectors such as energy
production.  Given the close link between R&D and diffusion, policies that promote R&D
                                               
5 In addition it would reduce greenhouse gas emissions directly by reducing the quantity of energy demanded.Allen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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will also benefit diffusion.  However, a review of the extensive literature on R&D policy is
outside the scope of this paper.
5.6   Intellectual Property Restrictions
Intellectual property restrictions such as patents and licenses have countervailing
effects on technology diffusion.  On one hand, they stimulate R&D, which in turn stimulates
diffusion.  Perhaps more important for developing countries, they are likely to encourage
foreign investment, which can be a significant source of new technologies.  But on the other
hand, intellectual property restrictions attach significant costs to adoption of new technologies
which retards diffusion.  In many developing countries, adaptation of existing technologies,
rather than the creation of substantially new ones may account for the bulk of productivity
growth.  Therefore, there is reason to suspect that the negative impact of intellectual property
restrictions on diffusion in developing countries could be substantial.
5.7   Conclusion
To summarize briefly, this section argues that the theoretical and empirical literature
on technology diffusion suggests the following:
(i) There is no guarantee that new technologies that have successfully diffused in
industrialized countries will diffuse widely or rapidly in developing countries,
or that they will diffuse at all.  To be successful, new technologies must be
"appropriate" to developing countries.
(ii) The dissemination of information about new technologies is critical to diffusion
but is likely to be imperfect, and therefore, there exists a presumptive argument
for subsides to activities that improve information flows such as demonstration
projects, testing and certification of new technologies, consultancy services, and
science parks.  However, we know little about the effectiveness of such policies.
(iii) More stringent regulation of polluting activities and reductions in energy
subsides are likely to speed the dissemination of energy efficient and CFTs.
(iv) If past experience is a guide, targeting credit for investments in CFTs is likely to
be costly and ineffective.  A better way to overcome financial barriers to
diffusion is to improve the financial intermediation.
(v) Investments in human capital and infrastructure in the energy sector will likely
speed of the diffusion of CFTs.
(vi) Intellectual property restrictions have countervailing effects on the diffusion of
new technologies.Allen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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Of the broad range of policy options presented here, which are likely to be politically
practical?  As mentioned in the introduction, technology-based strategies will generate
political support to the extent they represent obvious "win-win" opportunities for the parties
involved.  All of the policies described above fit this description to some degree.  Information,
human capital and infrastructure policies will enhance productivity; rationalizing energy
prices will boost allocative efficiency; improving financial intermediation should stimulate
saving and investment; and strengthening regulation should produce environmental benefits.
However, some of these policies involve up-front economic costs that are more immediate
and payoffs that are more delayed than others, making them unattractive to decision makers
with short time horizons.  For example, though investments in financial intermediation,
human capital (broadly defined) and environmental regulation may have tremendous benefits
in the long run, they involve substantial up-front costs.  Thus, the most practical policy
options discussed here would seem to be investments in improved information, energy
infrastructure, and the rationalization of energy prices.Allen Blackman  RFF 99-42
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